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Abstract
In this paper I analyse the effect of Brexit onUK labour productivity and its compo-
nents using a synthetic control methodology. My results show that the Brexit vote
had a negative impact on labour productivity, causing GDP per hour worked to
decrease by 2.4% by 2019 in comparison to the absence of Brexit. The two compo-
nents of labour productivity are GDP and hours worked. I find that the decrease in
the GDP is more than the increase in hours worked per person, causing the labour
productivity to decline.
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1 Introduction
On the 23th of June 2016, 51.9% of the UK electorate voted to leave the European
Union (EU), these results mean that the UK will enter into new trade and immigration
arrangements with the EU. The UK can negotiate trade arrangements and immigration
policies with the EU to stay in the single market, the custom union and provide easy
access to European skilled labour, or fail to negotiate a trade arrangements and thus fall
back to theWorld Trade Organisation (WTO) terms with the EU and new immigration
policies. Theuncertainty associatedwithnegotiating trade arrangementsmayaffect the
UK productivity and output through various channels. For example, companies may
be discouraged from investing in productivity-boosting technology. Trade, FDI, skilled
labour, and the movement of people between the United Kingdom and the European
Union will be reduced, leading to less innovation, less investment, less competition,
less access to talent, and fewer economies of scale. Thus, this will disproportionately
harm the productive, traded sectors of the economy, Dimson et al. (2016).
The UK formally signed the withdrawal agreement on the 31st of January 2020, but
until the point of writing this paper, the UK has not agreed on any trade deal with the
EU. Given that trading relationships between the UK and the EU member states have
not changed yet at the time of writing this paper, I expect that any slowdown in the
economic activities are due to expectations of the future uncertainty associated with
the negotiation of a trade agreement in the UK economy.
In this paper, I use synthetic control method of Abadie, Diamond, andHainmueller
(2010) in order to measure the causal effect of the Brexit vote on the UK’s productivity
by constructing a synthetic UK series that is not affected by the Brexit vote and analyse
what the UK series will look like in the absence of the Brexit referendum and the vote
to leave. The difference between the UK series and the synthetic UK series is the causal
effect of the Brexit vote. The variables that I investigate are labour productivity (GDP
per hour worked) and its components.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides literature review.
Section 3 provides a detailed overview of the synthetic control method. Section 4
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describes the data used. Section 5 provides the results and discussion. Section 6
assesses our validity of the results using permutation tests. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Other papers who used the synthetic control method to assess the impact of Brexit vote
are Breinlich et al. (2020) and Born et al. (2019). Breinlich et al. (2020) found that the
UK outward FDI increased by 17% and inward FDI decreased by 9% to and from the
remaining 27 EU member states as firms and manufacturers shifted their operations
from the UK to the remaining EUmember states to benefit from the access of the single
market. Born et al. (2019) found that the Brexit vote caused a UK output loss of 1.7%
to 2.5% by year end 2018. The results of these papers using the same methodology of
synthetic control are consistent with my results that the UK is worse off following the
results of the Brexit vote. Additionally, Gasiorek, Serwicka, and Smith (2019) analyses
the implications of Brexit on the 122 manufacturing industries through investigating
5 different scenarios of trade arrangements to find that all the 5 scenarios will have
negative outcome impact on the UK manufacturing sector. Bloom et al. (2019) use
survey approach of UK firms to identify the effects of the Brexit referendum. They also
found that the Brexit referendum reduced the investment by 11% over the three years
following the referendum. They found that the productivity dropped by 2 - 5% in the
three years following the referendum,much of this is from a negativewithin-firm effect
as top management commit number of hours per week on Brexit planning. Crafts and
Mills (2020) found that by 2018, 10 years after the great recession, the UK productivity
was 19.7% below the productivity growth trend. They attribute this under performing
to the great recession, waning impact of Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) and the uncertainty about international trading following Brexit. That is to
say, the results of our analysis will complement the literature about factors causing
slowdown in the UK productivity.
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3 Methodology
The synthetic control method uses a weighted average of a set of potential control units
to provide a synthetic control units that closely resembles the affected unit in terms of
predictors. In the context of theUKBrexit scenario, suppose that I have 퐽+1 units (here:
country pairs) in periods 푡 = 1, 2, ...., 푇(here: years), where unit 푗 = 1, is the treated
unit (here:UK) and units 푗 = 2, ....퐽+1 are the untreated units used in the control group
(here: OECD countries). Unit 푗 = 1 is exposed to the intervention (here: outcome of the
Brexit referendum) of at periods푇0+1, ...., 푇, while being unaffected during the periods
1, ....., 푇0. In my analysis, I use 2016 as the period of intervention. 푌
푁
푖푡 is the outcome
of unit 푖 in the absence of intervention for units 푖 = 1, ....., 퐽 + 1. 푌퐼푖푡 is the outcome
of unit 푖 at time 푡 if the unit is exposed to intervention in periods 푇0 + 1, ..., 푇. The
intervention has no impact on the pre-intervention periods. 푌푁푖푡 = 푌
퐼
푖푡 for 푡 = 1, ...., 푇0.
However, in practice, interventions may have an impact prior to their implementation
(e.g., via anticipation effects) Abadie, Diamond, andHainmueller (2010). 푌푁푖푡 can not be
observed in the post-intervention period 푡 = 푇0 + 1, ....푇. Thus, it can best be modelled
by a weighted average combination of untreated units in the donor pool.
The synthetic control can be represented by a (퐽x1) vector ofweights푊 = (푤2, ...., 푤 푗+1)
′
where 0 ≤ 푤 푗 ≤ 1 for 푗 = 2, ...퐽 + 1 and 푤2 + ..... + 푤 푗+1 = 1.The constructed synthetic
control unit is 푌ˆ푁1푡 is a weighted average of the untreated units of in the donor pool.
One of the main assumptions of the synthetic control approach is that countries in
the donor pool are not directly affected by the results of the Brexit referendum, nor
any contemporaneous events. The choice of 푊 such that the characteristics of the
treated unit are best resembled by the characteristics of the synthetic control. 푋1 is a
(푘x1) vector of pre-intervention characteristics of the treated unit. 푋0 is (푘x푗)matrix of
the same characteristics of the donor pool1. The vector 푊 ∗ is chosen to minimise the
difference between the pre-intervention characteristics of the treated unit and the the
synthetic control unit 푋1 − 푋0푊 . 푊
∗ is the value of 푊 that minimises | |푋1 − 푋0푊 | |
1See Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) for details about the calculation of the weights
matrix.
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subject to the constraints of 푤 푗 mentioned above. According to Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller (2015)푊 ∗ is chosen to minimise
푘∑
푚=1
푣푚(푋1푚 − 푋0푚푊)
2
where 푣푚 is a weight that reflects the relative importance that we assign to the 푚-
th variable when we measure the discrepancy between 푋1 and 푋0푊 . Typically, 푉
is selected to weight the predictors in accordance to their predictive power on the
outcome. If 푉 is diagonal with main diagonal equal to (푣1, ...., 푣푘), then푊
∗ is equal to
the value of 푊 for the above minimisation. The constructed synthetic control unit is
푌ˆ푁1푡 is a weighted average of the untreated units of in the donor pool.
푌ˆ푁1푡 =
퐽+1∑
푗=2
푤∗푗푌푗푡
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) show that if the weighted average of the
synthetic control characteristics 푋0 can match the treated unit characteristics 푋1, it
provides a valid counterfactual for 푌푁푗푡 in the sense that 푌ˆ
푁
1푡 − 푌
푁
푗푡 is close to 0 in the
pre-intervention period, 푡 = 1, ...., 푇0. For the post-intervention period, where 푡 ≥ 푇0,
the treatment effect is the difference between the realized outcome and the synthetic
control outcome.
푌1푡 −
퐽+1∑
푗=2
푤∗푗푌푗푡
4 Data
The sample dataset include 19 OECD countries, the sample spans from 1995 to 20192.
All the data are with annual frequency and obtained from the OECD database. De-
scription of each variable used are available in table 1.
2The original sample included 23 OECD countries, but I had to remove Belgium, Canada and
Switzerland due to the lack of data for GDP per hour worked
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Variable Description Source
GDP Annual GDP, expenditure
approach, USD current
prices fixed PPPs, annual
levels
Annual national accounts
Consumption Annual private final con-
sumption expenditures,
volume
Quarterly national ac-
counts
Investment Annual gross fixed capital
formation, total, volume
Quarterly national ac-
counts
Exports Annual exports of goods
and services, national ac-
count basis, volume
Quarterly national ac-
counts
Imports Annual imports of goods
and services, national ac-
count basis, volume
Quarterly national ac-
counts
Employment Annual total employment,
labour force survey basis
Quarterly national ac-
counts
Population Annual working age popu-
lation, age 15-74
Quarterly national ac-
counts
GDP per hour worked Annual total, 2010 = 100 OECD database
Hours worked Annual total hours per
worker
OECD database
Labour productivity
growth
Log difference between the
GDP and the employment
OECD database
Inflation Annual CPI annual growth
rate
OECD database
Table 1: Descriptions of the economic variables used and their sources.
5 Results:
5.1 Impact of Brexit Vote on Labour Productivity
Table 2 shows the weights assigned to each country in the donor pool to construct
Synthetic UK’s productivity, where its constructed by a combination of USA, Norway
Finland, Italy and Portugal. Table 3 compares the pre-Brexit vote characteristics of the
UK to that of Synthetic UK and weighted average of all countries in the donor pool.
The results of table 3 show that for the pre-Brexit period (1995 - 2015) on average for
all the variables the synthetic UK provides much closer values to the UK compared to
the values of the sample mean of all the countries in the donor pool.
Figure 1 shows a plot of the GDP per hour worked of the UK against the Synthetic
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Country Synthetic Control Weight Country Synthetic Control Weight
USA 32.3% Finland 26.8%
Norway 23.0% Portugal 1.8%
Italy 7.5% Netherlands 2.4%
Austria <1% Australia <1%
New Zealand <1% Luxembourg <1%
Spain <1% Germany <1%
Sweden <1% Hungary <1%
Slovak <1% France <1%
Japan <1% Korea <1%
Czech <1%
Table 2: Weights assigned to each country in the donor pool to construct synthetic UK.
Variable UK Synthetic UK Sample mean
Investment share of GDP 0.168 0.215 0.23
Log GDP 14.649 13.929 13.301
Imports share of GDP 0.253 0.268 0.396
Exports share of GDP 0.252 0.291 0.423
Labour productivity growth 28.106 28.222 27.848
Employment share 0.631 0.626 0.596
CPI 2.180 2.107 2.562
Log GDP (2011) 14.749 0.445 0.489
GDP per hour worked (2000) 4.461 4.461 4.603
GDP per hour worked (2012) 4.602 4.608 4.621
GDP per hour worked (2015) 4.621 4.627 4.651
GDP per hour worked (2012) 4.616 4.634 4.653
Table 3: GDP per Hour Worked Predictors Means before UK Brexit Vote. Column 1
reports 푋1, column 2 reports 푊푋0 and column 3 reports a simple average of all the
countries in the donor pool.
UK from 1995 to 2019. The plot shows that the UK and the synthetic UK GDP per
hour worked both had the same trend over time, as the synthetic UK closely mimics
the performance of the UK for the entire sample. However, following the Brexit vote,
the UK series under performed the synthetic UK series and the gap between the 2
series widened after 2016. Figure 2, shows a plot of the gap between the UK and the
synthetic UK, following the Brexit vote, the gap between the UK and the synthetic
UK widened and is negatively significant. The results show that at 68% confidence
interval, the Brexit vote had a significant negative impact on theUK’s productivity after
mid 2016. The confidence interval bands are constructed as one standard deviation of
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the difference between the UK and synthetic UK in the pre-Brexit period 3.
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Figure 1: Log of annual GDP per hour
worked for the UK and the synthetic UK.
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Figure 2: Gap between the UK and the
synthetic UK GDP per hour worked .
The Brexit impact can be modelled by a step dummy and a set of pulse dummies
Harvey and Thiele (2017). The set of pulse dummies 휆 푗푑
∗
푡 show the intermediate effect
of the Brexit vote over the short run, while the step dummy variable 휆푑푡 models the
long run impact. The long run impact takes effect after 푚 ≥ 1 time periods. In the
case of the Brexit analysis, the long run impact will take place after the UK leaves the
EU and a Brexit deal is negotiated, in our sample a Brexit deal is still in the process of
negotiation. Therefore, I will be modelling the intermediate effect of the Brexit vote on
the labour productivity.
푦0푡 − 푦
푐
푡 = 휇
푐
푡 + 휆푑푡 +
푚∑
푗=1
휆 푗푑
∗
푡 + 휖0푡 , , 푡 = 1, ...., 푇 (1)
푑푡 =


0, for 푡 < 푇0 + 푚
1, for 푡 ≥ 푇0 + 푚, 1 < 푇0 + 푚 ≤ 푇
푑∗푡 =


0, for 푡 ≠ 푇0 + 푗 − 1,
1, for 푡 = 푇0 + 푗 − 1, 푗 = 1, ...., 푚
The Brexit referendum took place in June 2016, the pulse dummy variables take value
of 1 from, 푇0, 2016 till the end of the sample 2019 to model the uncertainty associated
3I follow the approach of Born et al. (2019) in constructing the confidence interval as 1 standard error
of the difference between the UK and synthetic UK in the pre-Brexit period.
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with the Brexit deal negotiations, while the step dummy variable takes a value of 1,
after a Brexit deal is negotiated to model the long run impact of the Brexit deal, which
is not captured by this paper yet.
Variable Coefficient P-value
Pulse dummy variable 2016 -0.01858548 4.904e-09***
Pulse dummy variable 2017 -0.02573311 1.678e-11***
Pulse dummy variable 2018 -0.02182044 3.161e-10***
Pulse dummy variable 2019 -0.02353821 8.313e-11***
Table 4: Estimation of equation 1, the pulse dummy variables take a value of 1 in each
of the years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 0 in other years. The regression is estimated
using Newey west HAC-SE to avoid the problem of serial correlation, the significance
codes are . 0.1 ,* 0.05 significance, ** 0.01 significance, *** 0 significance.
The results of equation 1, are in table 4, show that due to the Brexit vote, the UK’s
labour productivity under performed its synthetic counterpart by an average of 2.37%
in the three years following the Brexit vote, where in the absence of the Brexit vote, the
UK’s productivity would have been on the same growth path as that of the synthetic
UK.
5.2 Impact of Brexit Vote on GDP
In assessing the impact of the Brexit vote on the UK’s GDP, I construct the synthetic
UK from a pool including 18 countries. Table 5 shows the weights assigned to each
country in the donor pool. Synthetic UK GDP is best constructed by a combination of
USA, Italy, New Zealand, Luxembourg and Portugal. Table 6 compares the pre-Brexit
vote characteristics of the UK to that of the synthetic UK and weighted average of all
countries in the donor pool. The synthetic UK series characteristics arematched closely
to the UK series than the weighted average of the donor pool.
Figure 3 displays a plot of the UK’s GDP against the synthetic UKGDP from 1995 to
2019. Theplot shows that theUKand the syntheticUK series are both on the same trend
for the entire sample, following the Brexit vote the UK GDP series underperformed
the synthetic UK. Figure 4 shows the gap between the UK series and the synthetic UK
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Country SC Weight Country SC Weight
USA 48.0% Italy 23.7%
New Zealand 19.6% Luxembourg 7.2%
Portugal 1.4% Netherlands <1%
Finland <1% Australia <1%
France <1% Norway <1%
Austria <1% Korea <1%
Spain <1% Japan <1%
Sweden <1% Germany <1%
Slovak <1% Hungary <1%
Table 5: Weights assigned to each country in the donor pool to construct synthetic UK
real GDP.
Variable UK Synthetic UK Sample Mean
Consumption share of GDP 0.656 0.610 0.534
Investment share of GDP 0.168 0.204 0.224
Imports share of GDP 0.253 0.277 0.402
Exports share of GDP 0.252 0.282 0.429
Labour Productivity Growth 28.106 28.389 27.797
Employment share 4 0.631 0.606 0.596
Log Real GDP (2011) 14.749 14.765 13.452
Table 6: GDP predictors Means before UK Brexit Vote. Column 1 reports 푋1, column
2 reports푊푋0 and column 3 reports a simple average of all the countries in the donor
pool.
series, where the gap between the UK and its synthetic counterpart widened following
the Brexit vote and on a downward trend. The deviation between the two series is
statistically significant. Born et al. (2019), who constructed the UK GDP series using
quarterly Real GDP found similar results to mine that the UK under performed the
synthetic UK5. In monetary terms, I find that the UK underperformed its synthetic
counterpart in 2016 by 2.3 billion dollars, 18.2 billion dollars in 2017, 51.2 billion in
2018 and a further loss of 63.9 billion dollars in 2019. Hence, the cumulative of loss for
the UK GDP between 2016 to 2019 is almost 133.3 billion dollars. Table 7 below shows
the estimation of the regression of equation 1, where the real GDP was significantly
negatively affected in 2017 by 0.2%, 1.4% in 2018 and 1.8% in 2019 as a result of the
Brexit vote and the uncertainty associated with the negotiation of the Brexit deal.
5Born et al. (2019) found that by end of 2018, the GDP loss accounted for £55 billion.
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Variable Coefficient P-value
Pulse dummy variable 2016 0.0028155 0.2033
Pulse dummy variable 2017 -0.0026668 0.2273
Pulse dummy variable 2018 -0.0137861 2.794e-06 ***
Pulse dummy variable 2019 -0.0177481 6.692e-08 ***
Table 7: Estimation of equation 1, the pulse dummyvariables take a value of 1 in each of
the years 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 and 0 in other years. The regression is estimated log
of the real GDP using Newey west HAC-SE to avoid the problem of serial correlation,
the significance codes are . 0.1 ,* 0.05 significance, ** 0.01 significance, *** 0 significance.
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Figure 3: Annual real GDP UK and the
synthetic UK in trillion dollars
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Figure 4: Gap between the UK and the
synthetic UK real GDP.
5.3 Impact of Brexit Vote on Labour Input
Labour input, measured as the labour hours worked, is defined as the total number
of hours actually worked per person, effectively used in production6. In assessing
the impact of Brexit vote on the labour input in the UK, I construct the synthetic UK
based on a combination of all the countries in the donor pool. Table 8 shows the
weights assigned to each country in the donor pool to construct synthetic UK labour
hours worked. Table 9 shows that the pre-Brexit vote predictors of the UK are closely
matched by the synthetic UK series compared to weighted average of all the countries
in the donor pool. Hence, the combination of the synthetic UK series made up of
18 countries is best used to mimic the performance of the UK series than any other
weighted average. Figure 5 shows a plot of the UK labour hours worked against that
of the Synthetic UK. Although the UK number of hours worked started to decrease
6Hours actuallyworked reflect regular hoursworkedby full-time andpart-timeworkers, paid andun-
paid overtime hours worked in additional jobs, excluding hours not worked because of public holidays,
annual paid leaves, strikes and labour disputes, bad weather, and economic conditions. (OECDhours)
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following the Brexit vote, the synthetic UK was on a steady trend for the whole entire
period and the UK series was above it, but the gap between the two series narrowed
following the Brexit vote 7.
Country Synthetic Control Weight Country Synthetic Control Weight
Netherlands 58.5% USA 29.7%
Germany 7.7% Luxembourg <1%
Italy <1 % France <1%
Slovak <1 % Spain <1%
Finland <1% Portugal <1%
Austria <1% Norway <1%
Australia <1% Hungary <1%
New Zealand <1% Czech <1%
Sweden <1% Japan <1%
Table 8: Weights assigned to each country in the donor pool to construct synthetic UK.
Variable Treated Unit Synthetic Unit Sample Mean
Investment 0.168 0.203 0.225
Log GDP 14.649 14.490 13.324
Labour Produc-
tivity Growth
28.106 28.146 27.818
Employment
share
0.631 0.631 0.604
CPI 2.180 2.156 2.435
Log Labour
Hours Worked
(2010)
7.315 7.332 7.401
Table 9: Labour hours predictors means before UK Brexit Vote. Column 1 reports 푋1,
column 2 reports 푊푋0 and column 3 reports a simple average of all the countries in
the donor pool.
Figure 6 displays that in the post-Brexit period, the gap in the number of hours
worked between the UK and its synthetic counterpart narrowed. Table 10 shows the
regression estimation of equation 1, the results show that although the coefficients of
the dummy variables are positive and significant, they decreased significantly between
2017 and 2018 before it increased again in 2019 but still below that of 2017 to explain
the negative impact on the number of hours worked in the UK.
7The ONS average weekly hours of for full-time workers in the UK decreased from 37.5 in 2016 to
37.4 in 2017 and 37.1 in 2018.
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Figure 5: UK against synthetic UK annual
labour hours worked per person.
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Figure 6: gap between theUK and the syn-
thetic UK annual labour hours worked per
person.
Variable Coefficient P-value
Pulse dummy variable 2016 0.0079071 0.0007529***
Pulse dummy variable 2017 0.0085328 0.0003611***
Pulse dummy variable 2018 0.0062414 0.0052200**
Pulse dummy variable 2019 0.0079218 0.0007400***
Table 10: Estimation of equation 1, the pulse dummy variables take a value of 1 in each
of the years 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 and 0 in other years. The regression is estimated
log of the hours worked using Newey west HAC-SE to avoid the problem of serial
correlation, the significance codes are . 0.1 ,* 0.05 significance, ** 0.01 significance, ***
0 significance.
6 Permutation Tests
In order to evaluate the credibility of my results that the UK labour productivity was
affected due to the Brexit vote, I perform two permutation tests. In time permutation
test and leave one out permutation test.
6.1 In Time Permutation Test
I assign the Brexit to a different year, 2012, instead of 2016. I use the same predictors of
table 3 and still finding that the synthetic UK series is closely matched to the UK series
than the weighted average of all the countries in the donor pool. Figure 7 displays the
results of the in time permutation test. The results show that the synthetic UK GDP
per hour worked almost reproduces the evolution of the UK GDP per hour worked
between 1995 and 2012. After the hypothetical 2012 Brexit assigned, the UK and the
synthetic UK do not diverge significantly and considerably from each other between
13
2012 and 2015, the small divergence was already present in the data as in figure 1.
Therefore, I can conclude that the widening of the divergence following 2016 in figure
1 is the casual effect of the Brexit vote on the UK GDP per hour worked.
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Figure 7: In Time Permutation Test, 2012 Brexit
6.2 Robustness Test
As the GDP per hour worked is constructed as a weighted average of the six countries
USA, Finland, Portugal, Norway, Italy and Netherlands. I run a robustness check to
test the sensitivity of my results to changes in weights assigned to each country in the
donor pool, I do so by re-estimating the synthetic UK five times each time by omitting
one of the countries in the donor pool. Figure 8 displays the UK, Synthetic UK and the
re-estimated synthetic UK when omitting one of the countries in the donor pool. The
results show that the synthetic UK constructed in figure 1 by the combination of the
six countries is robust to the exclusion of any particular country from the donor pool.
6.3 Balanced growth test
Harvey and Thiele (2017) suggest that the target and its synthetic counterpart should
be cointegrated during the pre-intervention period, by using KPSS balanced growth
co-integration test on the contrast between the target and its synthetic counterpart to
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Figure 8: Robustness Check, Leave One Control Unit Out
test if both series are on the same growth path in the preintervention period. If the null
hypothesis of stationarity is not rejected, then the UK and its synthetic counterpart are
on the same growth path, thus cointegrated over the pre-Brexit period. The results
of table 11 below shows that the contrast between the UK and synthetic UK GDP per
hour worked is stationary. Therefore, both series had the same growth path in the
pre-Brexit period.
KPSS level Critical value(10%)
0.21002 0.347
Table 11: KPSS(2) balanced growth test for the contrast between the UK and synthetic
UK GDP per hour worked
7 Conclusion:
In this paper I examined the impact of the Brexit vote on the labour productivity of the
UK. By using synthetic control method, I identify the effect of the Brexit vote by con-
structing synthetic UK series to compare it to the actual UK series. My estimates found
three key impacts the Brexit vote caused to the UK economy. Firstly, in comparison to
its synthetic counterpart, the UK’s labour productivity under performed by an average
of 2.37% over the three years following the Brexit vote, and by 2.4% in 2019, which re-
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flects the uncertainty in the UK investment and labourmarkets associatedwith leaving
the EUwithout a trade deal. Secondly, the UK Real GDP had a cumulative loss of 133.3
billion dollars between 2016 to 2019. Lastly, I found that average annual hours worked
per person are 2.16 and 4.17 hours more in 2018 and 2019 than the synthetic UK. As
the labour productivity is constructed by the GDP and the labour hours worked, the
decrease in the GDP is more than the slight increase in the labour hours worked, thus
the labour productivity was negatively affected.
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